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ABSTRACT 
 
DETERRITORIALISATION OF IMAGE: 
MAPPING OUT NEW MEDIA 
 
Bican Polat 
M.F.A. in Graphic Design 
 
Supervisor: Zafer Aracagök 
July, 2003 
 
This study endeavours to elaborate the possibilities that new media would have 
within the practice of art. Diverging from the pre-existing media, new media 
emerges as being based on the idea of digitisation. Depending upon the principles 
of variability and modularity it retains the capacity to link documents, images, 
sounds and texts in a variety of non-linear paths. The study aims to elaborate on 
new media within the context of Deleuzian “logic of multiplicities”. 
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ÖZET 
 
İMGENİN YERTSİZYURTSUZLAŞTIRILMASI: 
YENİ MEDYAYI HARİTALANDIRMAK 
 
Bican Polat 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Zafer Aracagök 
Temmuz, 2003 
 
Bu çalışma yeni medyanın sanat pratiği içinde sahip olabileceği olanakların 
ayrıntılandırılmasını amaçlamıştır. Daha önceki medyanın biçimlerinden 
farklılaşan yeni medya sayısallaştırma fikri üzerine kurulu olarak belirir. 
Değişkenlik ve modülerlik ilkelerine dayanarak çok sayıda doküman, imge, ses ve 
metni lineer olmayan çeşitli yollarla bağlama yetisine sahiptir. Bu çalışma yeni 
medyanın Deleuze’ün “çokluklar mantığı” bağlamında geliştirilmesini 
amaçlamıştır. 
 
Anahtar Sozcükler: Yeni Medya, Sayısallık, Sayısal Sanat, Deleuze 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, there appears a great deal of discussions about whether the 'new media 
technologies' create a space for art making or not. In other words, the question is: 
does the notion of  'new media' extend its limits to where it refers not only to 
design application or programming but also to a certain kind of artistic activity? 
All computerized processes, including internet applications, web sites, computer 
multimedia, digital imaging etc. offers a variety of handling, storing and 
manipulating images, texts and sound. But the question is whether this 'new 
terrain' with its multitude of techniques and freedom would provide us with the 
tools for artistic image production.  
 
However, the question begs the other ones. First of all, in order to have a better 
understanding of theory and practice of new media, we should ask what the 
characteristics that determine the emergence of it in our era are. This question 
will eventually lead us to think the relevance of the 'new media' within the 
context of painting, photography and cinematography.  
 
Painting, understood traditionally, aims at the representation of nature or human 
beings employing various techniques of figural composition, contour and color 
combinations. Photography seems to keep that representative nature while 
adopting a chemical process which is determined according to the contrast of 
light. In both practices, the image is determined by a single pose which serves as 
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an immobile section. Moreover, photographic image has been declared to capture 
‘reality’.  
 
In the twentieth century, the emergence of cinematography provided the mobility 
of the image while maintaining its ability to represent that ‘reality’. Employing 
the same chemical process of photography, cinema has also the capacity to record 
movement. And finally, in the second part of the century it can store and 
manipulate images with sound. Although new media puts into practice the various 
techniques from each, it has itself a genuine difference. That is the computable 
nature of any information it possesses.  
 
In other words, new media is solely based on the principle of translating all 
existing media into numerical data. It provides the integration of data, text, 
images and sound within a single information environment. Technological 
developments such as fast microprocessors, high-resolution screens, audio and 
video digitising and compression techniques enabled new media to store and 
manipulate information of any kind. That is why, in "The Language of The New 
Media" Lev Manovich asserts that we are in the middle of a new media 
revolution. He defines this revolution as "the shift of all culture to computer-
mediated forms of production, distribution and communication"(Manovich 19).  
 
Thus, the key concept behind new media may be posed as digitisation. It is the 
conversion of image, text, and sound to numbers. From this it follows that all 
existing media forms can be translated into digits in order to be manipulated by a 
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computer. Seen from that aspect, new media seems to challenge our notions of 
'reality', 'representation', 'space' and 'time'. Employing new techniques of 
obtaining and manipulating images or sounds, it attacks on the always-already 
pre-supposed opposition of  'the model' and 'the copy'. Unlike old media which 
works with the notion of ‘original’, new media deals with copies of information 
which can be reproduced infinitely. 
 
What we are face to face is another level of reality, with its folded arrangements 
and complicated relations. This peculiar universe is no more like the one once we 
had. Hence, we are confronted with a new way of looking and interpreting the 
phenomena. For this reason, the first point of my thesis will be to interrogate in 
what ways ‘new media’ forces us to think and act differently.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I will try to establish connections - but not interpretations - 
with Deleuzian 'logic of multiplicities'. According to him a multiplicity is not 
what has many parts, but what is complicated or folded many times. For Deleuze, 
then, to think in terms of multiplicities is to think with such complexity. And to 
think in terms of multiplicities is to connect. Hence, my aim will be to have a 
map of new media in terms of "plateaus into which conceptual pieces enter or 
settle along the web of their interrelations"(Rajchman 21). 
 
The second point of the thesis will be to ask if it is possible to extract a certain 
kind of  'artistic language' from this ever-changing terrain of new media 
technologies. In other words, I will put into question the possibility of the work 
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of art within 'new media'. By contemplating on painting and cinematography, I 
will try to map out resonances and interferences which new media would have 
with these distinct fields.  
 
In Cinema: The Movement-Image, Deleuze argues that, understood as a system of 
representation, cinema appeals to the conventional division of subject and object 
or spectator and image. However, he puts it forward as a plane of immanence on 
which image and thought merge. This is a virtual plane, which is composed of 
incorporeals, namely, events and singularities. Likewise, in Francis Bacon: Logic 
of Sensation he discusses how Bacon, opposing the narrative and representative 
elements in painting, creates that plane of immanence in the canvas. 
 
I will argue that, in a similar way, being relieved from the representation of the 
images of visible 'reality', 'new media' posesses the power to experiment and 
search for new possibilities of diverse forms. For Deleuze, to connect is to work 
with other possibilities, not already given. Hence, he would say that to think is to 
experiment. To experiment is to connect, and to connect is to affirm. Indeed, this 
is what Manovich thinks that Vertov did in cinema and that the new media artist 
have to learn: "how to merge database and narrative into a new form"(Manovich  
xxviii).   
 
In both volumes of Cinema, Deleuze employs Bergsonian thesis about movement 
as a tool for extending his philosophy. The main point of Bergson in articulating 
this thesis was to outline a new ontology concerning the becoming of things. 
 5 
However, Deleuze applied it to cinematography and redefined the 
cinematographic image within that conceptualisation. But still, Deleuze's interest 
was philosophical. In an interview which is published in 1986 in Cahier du 
Cinema he says “I was able to write about cinema, not because of some right 
consideration, but because philosophical problems compelled me to look for 
answers in the cinema…”(Flaxman 367).  
 
Thus, besides being consisted of a taxonomy of images, the two volumes of 
Cinema I-II (1983-1985) traces a philosophical trajectory which is co-existent 
with Deleuze’s oeuvre that can be traced back to Bergsonism (1956). Likewise, 
beside praising the paintings of Bacon, his aim in Francis Bacon: Logic of 
Sensation (1981) is to work out the kinds of relations philosophy would have with 
art. 
 
Similarly, I will try to extend his way of thinking to the terrain of new media. 
Investigating the possibilities of this terrain, I will contemplate upon Deleuzian 
logic of multiplicities. For to connect is to think and to think is to experiment. As 
Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta mention in the translation of Cinema II, The 
Time-Image: “philosophy itself is not a reflection on an autonomous object but a 
practice of creation of concepts, a constructive pragmatism” (Cinema II xv). 
  
Throughout my thesis, I shall simply follow the trajectory of Deleuzian thought in 
order to evaluate the interest of cinematography, painting and finally ‘new 
media’. As mentioned above, this paper has two distinct intentions, which will be 
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mapped out regarding the 'resonances' and 'interferences' they constitute with 
each other. To put it in other words, my main attempt will be to pose 'new media' 
as a terrain that the conditions under which something new, yet unthought, will 
arise. Once having put the new ways of thinking that accompany this terrain, we 
may now pose ‘new media’ as a space for art making - a space which is pregnant 
to new forces not already contained in it. 
 
However, I will not attempt to give a historical account of new media 
technologies. Though it is highly important to map out how digital media 
developed from the old media within a historical course, in my thesis, I will limit 
my study to a specific extent, in which I will be developing some basic 
contemporary concepts. In this sense, instead of following the progress and 
innovations which took place within the last decade of the twentieth century, I 
prefer to adopt a synchronic approach that aims at a general view of 
contemporary digital media. 
 
Also, I will not be investigating the technical aspects. Not only because that will 
require expertise and adequacy in computer science and engineering but also 
because of a right consideration in order not to lose the focus. Such an attempt 
will exceed the limits of this work which aims to end up in a philosophical survey 
rather than an utter disorder. 
 
Since the scope of this rapidly expanding field shows a variety of applications 
from hypertext and multimedia systems, internet and on-line documentation to 
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information architecture, interface design, digital imaging, 3-D modelling etc., I 
will not be dealing with each one by one. For the sake of brevity and intensity, I 
will take some basic notions into consideration and elaborate them. 
 
In the first chapter, which is called ‘Cinema and Representation’, I will discuss 
cinematography within a Deleuzian perspective. The first part of this chapter 
gives a brief account of Bergson’s philosophy of becoming. According to 
Bergson, movement is distinct from the space covered. Moreover, he argues that 
movement cannot be reconstituted by adding immobile sections. Such an attempt 
will end up in illusion. Indeed, this is the reason why Bergson sees 
cinematography as reproducing the illusion. 
 
The second part involves the transformation of Bergsonian account of cinema. 
Adopting the philosophy of becoming which is introduced by Bergson, Deleuze 
attempts to reconsider cinematic image. For Deleuze, cinema does not constitute 
movement by adding immobile sections. Instead, the cinematic image consists of 
mobile sections.  
 
The third part is about the conclusions of this transformation. Deleuze argues that 
within that moving image, which is a concrete intermediary, we confront with a 
peculiar perception of time and its effects on thought. The cinematic image gives 
us a plane of multiplicities where events, forces and singularities emerge. Rather 
than being exposed to representation of bodies and things, we become acquainted 
with new ways of thinking about the reality of becoming. 
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The second chapter is about the painting’s of Francis Bacon. I will discuss how 
Deleuze connects the art of Bacon to his own way of philosophising. In his 
attempt to escape from the figurative and representative elements of traditional 
painting, Bacon accomplishes to create the same plane of multiplicities in his 
canvas. By employing special techniques of asignifying traits and wiping-off, he 
ends up in Figure, the non-figurative deformed body.  
 
The body, being isolated within the field, begins to lose its contour. It dissipates 
into the field. Hence, we are confronted with forces. Revealing the forces that are 
exerted upon this Figure Bacon takes us to the realm of sensations. This is where 
we become face to face with becomings and multiplicities. Similarly, within this 
plane we are granted with new ways of thinking about movement and 
transformation.  
 
Finally, in the third chapter, I will discuss new media within this Deleuzian ‘logic 
of multiplicities’. In the first part I will map out some basic tendencies within the 
topography of new media technologies. I will refer to Lev Manovich’s book in 
order to set out some basic principles. Though, my attempt will not be to adopt 
these principles as absolute definitions. My aim will be just to map out some 
tendencies.  
 
However, Manovich’s fifth principle of cultural transcoding seems problematic. I 
will argue that it is based on the assumption of a duality between the real and the 
 9 
virtual. Therefore, I will refer to Deleuze, in order to get rid of this dichotomy. 
Elaborating on how new media objects differentiate from the structural computer 
programs, I will try to display the rhizomic structure of new media.  
 
Afterwards, I will elaborate the principles of variability and modularity within the 
context of Deleuzian thought. I will discuss the notions of database, interface, 
algorithm and hypernarrative coextensively with Deleuzian notions, such as plane 
of immanence, body-without-organs, forces, events, multiplicities. Hence, new 
media appears as the actualization of universal transformation and change. It is in 
this sense that it may be seen as the affirmation of Deluzian philosophy of 
becoming.  
 
Lastly, I will discuss the structure of web within the context of its non-
hierarchical organization. I will put forward the open nature of the web as that 
which enables us to establish new connections and arrangements within the global 
network. Instead of being created by a single author, web applications appears as 
domains which involve collaboration and interactivity. Seen from that aspect, web 
emerges as a labyrinth with forking paths. Breaking with the linearity, it involves 
an open flow of ideas and information within the network. 
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2 CINEMA AND REPRESENTATION  
 
In Cinema: The Movement-Image, Gilles Deleuze writes about three levels of 
Bergsonian thesis about movement. The main theme of the thesis is to distinguish 
between particular sets of things and the whole. According to Bergson, a set of 
things may contain very diverse elements but it is relatively closed or artificially 
limited. This is the first level. It concerns the sets or closed systems, which are 
defined by discernible objects and distinct parts.  
 
But the whole is of a different nature. It ranges over all sets of things. It relates to 
time and for Bergson time is the Open. It is the whole, which is not any set of 
things but the passage from one set to another. It is what is constantly changing in 
nature. This is the third level, namely, the duration or the whole as a spiritual 
reality that constantly changes according to its own relations.  
 
In between these levels there appears the second one. It is the movement of 
translation, which is established between these objects and modifies their 
respective positions. It is the transformation of one set of things into another. 
According to Deleuze, the Bergsonian thesis about movement is best understood 
in cinematography. “There are, as it were, three coexisting levels in 
cinematography: framing, which defines a provisional artificially limited set of 
things; cutting, which defines the distribution of movement or movements among 
the elements of the set; and then this movement reflects a change or variation in 
the whole, which is the realm of montage” (Negotiations 55).  
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For this reason, he thinks that it is an interesting coincidence that cinema 
appeared at the very time philosophy was trying to think motion. Hence, 
Bergsonian philosophy might have been trying to put motion into thought. In 
order to reveal the nature of this new way of thinking, I will elaborate some basic 
concepts of this thesis. 
 
2.1 Bergsonian Thesis on Movement 
 
2.1.1 Movement and Instant 
 
Bergson’s philosophy emphasizes the primacy of process and change rather than 
beings and things. He sees the objects as the snapshots of a flux, that is, duration. 
And this time or duration cannot be comprehended as dense set of instants. 
Similarly, change or movement cannot be posed as the world’s being in different 
states at different instants. 
 
According to Bergson, movement is distinct from the space covered. There is 
always a distinction between a movement and its trajectory. The movement is 
essentially unitary and indivisible. It cannot be constituted by adding instants to 
each other. Moreover, Bergson argues that movement is a qualitative whole and 
therefore it cannot be divided without changing qualitatively. The space covered 
is past and movement is present. This is why we may argue that the space covered 
is divisible while movement is indivisible. Deleuze states that “the spaces 
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covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, whilst the 
movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves” (Cinema I 1). 
Hence, the first part of Bergson’s argument about movement is that it cannot be 
divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided. 
 
According to the second part of the thesis, movement cannot be reconstituted with 
positions in space or instants in time. For Bergson, such an apprehension will be 
based on an illusion, that is, the assumption of an abstract idea of a succession, of 
a time that is mechanical and homogeneous. According to him, we can only 
achieve such a reconstitution by adding this abstract idea to the instants and 
positions. In other words, Bergson tries to assert that regardless of how much we 
divide space, movement will always occur in concrete duration. 
 
“And thus you miss the movement in two ways. On the one hand, you can bring 
two instants or two positions together to infinity; but movement will always occur 
in the interval between the two, in other words behind your back. On the other 
hand, however much you divide and subdivide time, movement will always occur 
in a concrete duration (durée); thus each movement will have its own qualitative 
duration. Hence we oppose two irreducible formulas: ‘real movement – concrete 
duration’, and ‘immobile sections + abstract time’ (Cinema I 1)”. 
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2.1.2 Movement and Change 
 
According to Bergson, movement is the mobile section of duration, namely, the 
Whole. In other words, it is the change in duration or in the whole. He argues that 
each time there is a translation of parts in space, there is also a qualitative change 
in a whole. “When Achilles overtakes the tortoise, what changes is the state of the 
whole which encompassed the tortoise, Achilles, and the distance between the 
two. Movement always relates to a change, migration to a seasonal variation. And 
this is equally true of bodies: the fall of a body presupposes another one which 
attracts it, and expresses a change in the whole which encompasses them both” 
(Cinema I 8). 
 
Moreover, Bergson thinks that, this duration or the whole is neither given nor 
giveable. It is not giveable because it is the Open. Hence, duration implies a 
whole which is changing and which is open somewhere. Its nature is to change 
constantly or to give rise to something new. And, the whole is defined by 
Relation. Relation is not the property of objects but what is external to its terms. 
Thus, we may say that, duration is the whole of relations. Through relations the 
whole is transformed or changes qualitatively.  
 
Unlike the sets, which are artificially closed, the whole is that which is Open. 
Since real whole cannot be divided without changing qualitatively at each stage 
of division, it is an indivisible continuity. In other words, the sets are in space, 
and the whole is the duration itself. “ ‘Immobile sections plus abstract time’ 
 14 
refers to closed sets whose parts are in fact immobile sections, and whose 
successive states are calculated on an abstract time; while ‘real movement-
concrete duration’ refers to the opening up of a whole which endures, and whose 
movements are so many mobile sections crossing the closed systems” (Cinema I 
10). 
 
Henceforth, Bergson would say that there are not only instantaneous images; 
immobile sections of movement but there are movement-images, which are 
mobile sections of duration. These mobile sections of duration are what constitute 
the essential element of reality. And intuition is the faculty that gives us this 
essential element of reality. Any other attempt that tries to constitute the 
movement with immobile sections will reproduce an illusion. 
 
It is in this sense; Bergson argues that cinema gives us a false movement. It gives 
us an immobile section plus abstract movement. For this reason, he sees 
cinematography as the perfected apparatus of the oldest illusion about movement. 
According to Bergson, cinematography reproduces this illusion because it works 
with immobile sections, that is, twenty-four still images per second. He thinks 
that what we see in the screen is a continuous movement, which is constituted by 
adding an abstract succession to immobile instants.  
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2.1.3 Bergson and Cinematography 
 
Bergson’s philosophy is based upon the epistemological duality of intellect and 
intuition. According to him, everything in the universe is in constant flux. So 
“movement is reality itself” (Creative Evolution 169). In order to attain the 
essential knowledge about the universe we should apprehend things not in 
stability but in mobility, namely, in their becomings. And this reality can only be 
grasped by intuition. Only by intuition we can apprehend the essential element of 
reality, duration. Intuition is the faculty to understand the flux of reality. It is the 
process employed in order to study movement, change and becoming. 
 
Intuition is the faculty, which is connected to life and duration whereas intellect 
is that which is connected to matter and spatialized time. For him, the intellect is 
a spatializing mechanism. It employs concepts, symbols, abstraction and analysis 
to acquire knowledge. It is best suited to the study of objects, immobility and 
being. Thus, it apprehends movement in static terms. It gives us a necessary but 
pragmatic grasp of reality. For this reason, Bergson employed cinematographical 
apparatus as an analogy for how the intellect approaches reality.  
 
“Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is also that of our 
knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we 
place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. 
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality. We may therefore sum up 
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that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind” 
(Creative Evolution 332). 
 
Indeed, Bergson thinks that cinema is a mechanical representation of the world. It 
functions in a manner similar to the way the intellect takes the ‘snapshots of 
reality’. The camera begins with a real movement since it attempts to record what 
is becoming. Then it breaks it down mechanically into a series of static frames. 
And it returns the movement through projecting. Since it employs a spatializing 
mechanism, cinema becomes incapable of representing real time or duration. It 
misses the movement itself by adding abstract time to immobile instants.  
 
This is why, according to Bergson, cinema gives us a false movement. It produces 
an illusion while constituting movement. Hence, what we see in a film is a 
reconstituted illusion. Deleuze mentions that, for Bergson, this illusion about 
movement emerges in two different ways throughout the history of Western 
thought. “For antiquity, movement refers to intelligible elements, Forms or Ideas 
which are themselves eternal and immobile…movement merely expresses a 
‘dialectic’ of forms, an ideal synthesis which gives it order and measure. 
Movement, conceived in this way, will thus be regulated transition from one form 
to another, that is, an order of poses or privileged instants, as in dance” (Cinema I  
4).  
 
But according to modern science movement is related to any-instant-whatever. 
“Although movement was still composed, it was no longer recomposed from 
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formal transcendental elements (poses), but from immanent material elements 
(sections)” (Cinema I 4). Within the Cartesian worldview the movement is 
redefined. And the dialectical order of poses is replaced by the mechanical 
succession of instants.    
 
Hence, Deleuze writes: “It is in this sense that the cinema is the system which 
reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever that is, as a function 
of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of continuity” 
(Cinema I 5). Seen from that aspect, cinema appears as the production of singular 
points which are immanent to movement. Thus, the cinematographic image 
emerges as the process where the production of singularities is achieved. Instead 
of the moments of actualisation of a transcendent form, the movement-image 
reveals the remarkable or singular points which belong to movement. 
 
The ancients reconstitute movement through eternal poses and the moderns 
through immobile sections. According to Deleuze, the problem in both cases is 
that the Whole is already assumed. When the whole is given movement can no 
longer exist. Since the Whole is always Open it cannot be constituted. Duration is 
that which is always in becoming. Hence, it can never be assigned. 
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2.2 Deleuzian Transformation 
 
Opposing Bergson, Deleuze argues that what we perceive in cinema is not the 
succession of instants but an indivisible intermediate. The movement belongs to 
this intermediate image as intermediate given. According to him, cinema does not 
give us an image to which movement is added, on the contrary, it immediately 
gives us a movement-image. It gives us a mobile section, not an immobile section 
plus abstract movement. Challenging the traditional view, which aims to 
constitute cinema by applying an abstract time to immobile sections, Deleuze 
offers a radical way of understanding that takes the movement-image as the 
mobile section of duration, and poses that image as the indivisible unit of cinema. 
 
Keeping the core of Bergson’s theory on movement and change, Deleuze attempts 
to show his misconception of cinematography. He tries to posit cinema as it is 
affirming and extending Bergsonian philosophy of becoming. As Boundas 
mentions “…Deleuze invites Bergson, the philosopher, to the movies in order to 
show him that his dismissal of the ‘cinematographic illusion’, that is, of 
reconstitution of movement on the basis of immobile slices or cuts, was in fact all 
too hasty. Cinema today, argues Deleuze, successfully meets Bergson’s challenge, 
because the age of camera verifies the system of universal variation that Bergson 
tried to articulate” (Boundas 20).  
 
Deleuzian transformation takes movement-image, the shot in cinema, as its 
starting point. The whole theory is built upon this concrete intermediary, which 
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acts as the movement of translation of a frame. The movement of translation is 
determined by a change in the respective positions of sets of things, that is, the 
objects and the characters in a frame. The movement-image has sub-categories 
such as perception-images, action-images and affection-images. The film emerges 
with the combination of these images with one another through montage, the open 
whole, in which all change takes place. 
 
Deleuze asserts that there are three coexisting levels in cinematography. The first 
one is framing, which defines an artificially limited set of things. It constitutes a 
network of relations between those that are framed. The second one is cutting, 
which is determined by the distribution of movement among the elements of the 
set. And the last one is montage, which is defined by a change or variation that 
takes place in the whole. 
 
2.2.1 The Closed Sets 
 
The closed sets are artificial systems that include discernible objects and distinct 
parts. Deleuze puts the first level as framing in cinema. So, a closed system is 
what includes all that is in the present image, that is, props, characters and sets. 
These elements are the legible data that may be understood as an information 
system. Then, the frame has a function of recording visual information. The shot 
is subsumed by the set. And a set is more specific than a shot because a set may 
include subsets such as moving camera shots. Deleuze writes that framing is “the 
determination of a closed system which includes everything which is present in 
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the image”(Cinema I 12). According to him, frame serves as an opaque surface of 
information.  
 
The frame has two tendencies. One is toward saturation and the other toward 
rarefaction. Rarefied images are produced when the whole accent is placed on a 
single object. Saturation can be attained when there appear secondary scenes in 
the foreground of a frame. “Frame serves as an opaque surface of information, 
sometimes blurred by saturation, sometimes reduced to the empty set, to the white 
or black screen” (Cinema I 13).  
 
Since the framing is a limitation it also implies an outside. This is the out-of-
field. It refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly 
present. When a set is framed, there is also a larger set with which the first forms 
a larger one. The out-of-field is that which forces the frame to extend itself into a 
larger set. It is the way that the closed system communicates. The out-of-field 
functions in two ways. Firstly, it constitutes actualisable relation with other sets 
by giving rise to a new unseen set. And secondly, it constitutes a virtual relation 
with the whole by opening the closed system into a duration. Deleuze summarises 
the analysis of the frame as follows: 
 
“Framing is the art of choosing the parts of all kinds which became part of a set. 
This set is a closed system, relatively and artificially closed. The closed system 
determined by the frame can be considered in relation to the data that it 
communicates to the spectators: it is ‘informatic’, and saturated or rarefied. 
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Considered in itself and as limitation, it is geometric or dynamic physical. 
Considered in the nature of its parts, it is still geometric or physical and dynamic. 
It is an optical system when it is considered in relation to the point of view, to the 
angle of framing: it is then pragmatically justified, or lays claim to a higher 
justification. Finally, it determines an out-of-field, sometimes in the form of a 
larger set which extends it, sometimes in the form of a whole into which it is 
integrated” (Cinema I 18). 
 
2.2.2 The Movement of Translation 
 
However, there is always a thread that links a closed system to the open whole. 
Deleuze writes: “The whole is therefore like the thread which traverses sets and 
gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily realised, of communicating 
with another, to infinity. Thus, the whole is the Open, and relates back to time or 
even to spirit rather than to content and to space” (Cinema I 17). Hence, we see 
that a closed system is never absolutely closed. It is connected to both other 
closed systems and finally to concrete duration. This connection is what refers to 
the second level.  
 
The second level is the shot, which can be seen as an intermediary between the 
two levels. According to Deleuze, it is the movement-image. It is the relationship 
between parts and its affection of the whole. On the one hand, a shot modifies the 
respective positions of the parts of a closed set. On the other it is itself the mobile 
section of a whole whose change it expresses. It is both the translation of the 
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parts of a set that spreads out in space and the change of a whole, which is 
transformed in duration. Deleuze argues: 
 
“...the shot, of whatever kind, has as it were two poles: in relation to the sets in 
space where it introduces relative modifications between elements or subsets; in 
relation to a whole whose absolute change in duration it expresses…The shot in 
general has one face turned towards the set, the modifications of whose parts it 
translates, and another face turned towards the whole, of which it expresses – or 
at least a – change. Hence, the situation of the shot, which can be defined 
abstractly as the intermediary between the framing of the set and the montage of 
the whole, sometimes tending towards the pole of framing, sometimes tending 
towards the pole of montage” (Cinema I 20). 
 
In cinematography, the shot is the movement of translation, which “reunites 
objects and sets into a single identical duration. It continuously divides duration 
into sub-durations which are themselves heterogenous, and reunites these into a 
duration which is immanent to the whole of the universe” (Cinema I 20). Thus, 
the shot is the movement-image. It is the concrete intermediary between a whole 
and a set. Seen from that aspect, it is the mobile section of a duration that acts 
like a consciousness, which carries out the divisions of duration and the reunion 
of objects. “it traces a movement which means that the things between which it 
arises are continuously reuniting into a whole, and the whole is continuously 
dividing between things” (Cinema I 20). 
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2.2.3 Duration 
 
Movement is a translation in space. But while there is a translation of parts in 
space, there is also a qualitative change in the whole. This change in the whole 
refers to concrete duration. Deleuze writes “…each time we find ourselves 
confronted with a duration, or in a duration, we may conclude that there exists 
somewhere a whole which is changing, and which is open somewhere” (Cinema I  
9). Since it is open, the whole is neither given nor giveable. Its nature is to 
change constantly and to give rise to something new. Hence, it is clear that the 
world or the universe is that which is open. It is not a closed system. A closed 
system will inevitably become an artificially closed set.  
 
“The whole and the ‘wholes’ must not be confused with sets. Sets are closed, and 
everything that is closed is artificially closed. Sets are always sets of parts. But a 
whole is not closed, it is open; and it has no parts except in a very special sense, 
since it cannot be divided without changing qualitatively at each stage of 
division” (Cinema I 10). Thus, the whole appears as an indivisible continuity. To 
define this continuity we should apply the notion of Relation. Since it is through 
relations the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively, duration itself 
becomes the whole of these relations.  
 
Respectively, in cinema, this whole equals to montage. The montage may be 
posed as the operation that bears on the movement-images in order to release the 
whole from them. This whole gives us an indirect image of time. It is 
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apprehended indirectly because this time or duration is deduced from movement-
images and their relationships. However, Deleuze argues that the montage does 
not come afterwards, it should be presupposed. It is the determination of the 
whole by means of continuities and cutting. 
 
In a conversation with Pascal Bonitzer and Jean Narboni, Deleuze mentions that 
“cinema’s always played upon these coexisting levels, each great auteur has its 
own way of conceiving and using them. In a great film, as in any work of art, 
there’s always something open. And it always turns out to be time, the whole, as 
these appear in every different film in very different ways” (Negotiations 56). For 
Deleuze, cinema appears as a plane that makes us think this relation between 
time, the whole and openness.  
 
The main point is to distinguish between particular sets of things and the whole. 
The whole is not the set of all sets. A set is closed and limited even if it contains 
very diverse elements. But the whole is of different nature. It is what changes 
constantly. It is not any set of things. It is the translation of one set of things into 
another. It is also that which stops the sets to become completely closed. 
Henceforth, it is the Open. That is the duration, in which all sets are embedded. In 
other words, it is the Time which acts as a ceaseless passage from one set to 
another.  
 
According to Deleuze, in cinema there are two distinct types of time perception. 
The first one is the indirect image of time, which is constituted by montage. It is 
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obtained through the successive arrangement of movement-images. Within such a 
system time is subordinated to movement. The perception of time is determined 
indirectly by the combination of these movement-images. The second one is the 
direct image of time that finds its actualisation in the time-image. Breaking with 
the indirect representation of time, a time-image is what gives us the pure image 
of time. Hence, it creates a reversal in the relation between time and movement. 
Movement becomes subordinated to time. In order to evaluate the significance of 
this time-movement relationship, we should better glance at the distinction that 
Deleuze makes between classical cinema and modern cinema. 
 
2.3 Becoming and Cinematography 
 
2.3.1 Movement and Time 
 
Deleuze distinguishes between two types of cinema. The former cinema, which is 
predominated before the World War 2, is dependent on movement and action. The 
characters in the movies of this period are placed in narrative positions. They act 
and react consciously to the events around them. “The cinema of action depicts 
sensory-motor situations: there are characters, in a certain situation, who act, 
perhaps very violently, according to how they perceive situation. Actions are 
linked to perceptions and perceptions develop into actions” (Negotiations 51). 
This period is determined by the movement-image. Time is subordinated to 
movement. It is indirectly represented in so far as it derives from movement-
images.  
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After the World War 2, a reversal has happened in the time-movement 
relationship. Time is no longer subordinated to movement. A direct time-image 
has been formed. Deleuze continues: “Now suppose a character finds himself in a 
situation, however ordinary or extraordinary, that is beyond any possible action, 
or to which he can’t react. It is too powerful, or too painful, too beautiful. The 
sensory-motor link is broken. He is no longer in a sensory-motor situation, but in 
a purely optical and aural situation. There is a new type of image” (Negotiations  
51). We are no longer in the same type of space. Having lost its motor connection 
space becomes disconnected.  
 
In modern cinema, characters find themselves in situations where they are unable 
to act and react in a direct, immediate way. Rational temporal links between shots 
gives way to incommensurable, non-rational links. Because of these non-rational 
links between shots vacant and disconnected spaces begin to appear. Deleuze 
writes: “Everything perhaps suddenly appears in a shattering of the sensory-motor 
schema: this schema, which had linked perceptions, affections and actions, does 
not enter a profound crisis without the general regime of the image being 
changed. In any case, the cinema has undergone a much more important change 
here than the one which happened with the talkie” (Cinema I ix). 
 
According to Deleuze, the movement-image is regulated by the sensory-motor 
action that responds to the demands of perception. Time-image is disconnected 
from the pragmatic needs of pure images that lead to a breakdown in the sensory-
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motor schema. Characters become unable to act and react in an immediate way 
and action becomes paralyzed. While there appear pragmatic necessities of 
narrative movement in the movement-image, the rational composition of narrative 
action breaks down in the time-image.  
 
According to Deleuze, there can be possible transformation and combinations 
between the movement-image and the time-image. No one is more important than 
the other. Yet, it is necessary to assess the difference.  
 
The movement-image constitutes time in its empirical form. It creates a 
successive present in relation of before and after. Hence, the past becomes a 
former present, and the future becomes a present to come. It also gives rise to an 
indirect image of time. In this case it employs the present as empirical 
progression. Time is no longer measured by movement but it becomes the 
measure of movement. This is the metaphysical representation of time. 
 
Deleuze argues, “…from either aspect, time is distinguished in this way from 
movement only as indirect representation. Time as progression derives from the 
movement-image or from successive shots. But time as unity or as totality 
depends on montage that still relates it back to movement or succession of shots. 
This is why the movement-image is fundamentally linked to an indirect 
representation of time, and does not give us a direct presentation of it, that is, 
does not give us a time-image” (Cinema II 271). 
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However, in modern cinema the time-image is neither empirical nor metaphysical. 
It presents itself in the pure state. It is no longer time, which is derived from 
movement; it is movement as false movement, which now depends on time. The 
break of the sensory-motor link can be seen as the main factor of this shift from 
classical to modern cinema. “What brings this cinema of action into question after 
the war is the very break up of the sensory-motor schema: the rise of situations to 
which one can no longer react, of environments with which there are now only 
chance of relations, of empty or disconnected any-space-whatevers replacing 
qualified extensive space” (Cinema II 272). 
 
Henceforth, in modern cinema there appears pure optical and sound situations, in 
which the character does not know how to respond. He finds himself wandering 
along the abandoned spaces in which he ceases to experience. However, Deleuze 
mentions that the character “…has gained in an ability to see what he has lost in 
action or reaction…this is no longer a sensory-motor situation, but a purely 
optical and sound situation, where the seer has replaced the agent” (Cinema II 
272). 
 
2.3.1 Deterritorialized Image 
 
Hence, we are presented with pure and direct images of time. Perception becomes 
purely optical and aural. Cut off from its motor development, an actual image 
comes into relation with a virtual image. Linear development leaves its place to a 
circular one. Real and imaginary become indistinguishable. The actual image and 
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its virtual image crystallize. Thus, there appears crystal image. Deleuze describes 
the consequences of this crystal image as follows: 
 
“In the first place, you see Time, layers of time, a direct time-image. Not that 
movement has ceased, but the relation between movement and time has been 
inverted. Time no longer derives from the combination of movement-images 
(from montage), it is the other way round, movement now follows from time. 
Montage does not necessarily vanish, but it plays a different role, becomes what 
Lapoujade calls ‘montrage’. Second, the image bears a new relation to its optical 
and aural elements: you might say that in its visionary aspect it becomes more 
‘legible’ than visible…Finally, image becomes thought, is able to catch the 
mechanisms of thought, while the camera takes on various functions strictly 
comparable to propositional functions” (Negotiations 52).  
 
Seen from that aspect, what is framed in a film is constituted via the 
representation of objects in present time. The camera shot includes bodies and 
their relation with each other within a single framework. These bodies are in 
present and made up of instants.  However, what we experience is not merely the 
represented bodies. We are confronted with a plane of immanence that renders 
change and transformation visible in screen. The screen becomes a plane of 
multiplicities, which are weaved through intensities and forces. Under a diverse 
perception of time we are introduced a peculiar way of thinking. Deleuze argues: 
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“Narrative in cinema is like the imaginary: it is a very direct product of motion 
and time, rather than the other way around. Cinema always narrates what the 
image’s movements and time make it narrate. If the motion’s governed by a 
sensory-motor scheme, if it shows a character reacting to a situation, then you get 
a story. If, on the other hand, the sensory-motor scheme breaks down to leave 
disoriented and discordant movements, then you get other patterns, becomings 
rather than stories” (Negotiations 59). Hence, cinema becomes the expression of 
life prior to what individualizes us. The screen is invaded by the multiplicities, in 
which events and singularities merge. Seen from that aspect, the levels 
concerning cinematography may be articulated within the context of Stoic 
philosophy, which aims to posit a difference between an incorporeal event and a 
corporeal body. 
 
The first level, closed sets, seems to resonate with the Stoic conception of bodies 
and the state of affairs in Logic of Sense. Deleuze states that there are bodies with 
their tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions, and the corresponding 
state of affairs. The mixture of bodies determines the state of affairs, actions and 
passions. There are no causes and effects among bodies. All bodies are causes in 
relation to each other. However, the effects are not bodies. They are not physical 
qualities and properties but rather incorporeal entities. They are events. They do 
not exist, but they subsist or insist.  
 
Deleuze states that “only bodies exist in space and only the present exists in time” 
(Logic of Sense 4). Hence, this is one of the two simultaneous readings of time. It 
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is the living present in which bodies act and acted upon. The other one is the 
entity infinitely divisible into past and future, and into the incorporeal effects. In 
other words, past and future insist in time and divide each present infinitely. The 
events or incorporeal entities “...are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They 
are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions. They are 
‘impassive’ entities – impassive results. They are not living presents, but 
infinities: the unlimited Aeon, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past 
and future and always eludes the present” (Logic of Sense 5).  
 
Mixtures determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs. This happens 
in two ways. A body penetrates another and coexists with it, or a body withdraws 
from the other. Hence, we see two planes of being: on the one hand there is real 
being, that is, things or bodies, on the other hand there is a plane of facts. The 
former consists of substances and the latter consists of events. This plane of 
effects is constituted by an endless multiplicity of incorporeal beings.  
 
“Thus in a sense movement has two aspects. On the one hand, that which happens 
between objects or parts; on the other hand that which expresses the duration or 
the whole. The result is that duration, by changing qualitatively, is divided up in 
objects, and objects, by gaining depth, by losing their contours, are united in 
duration”(Cinema 11, my emphasis). Regarding this last sentence, we may 
constitute a relationship between what Deleuze is figuring out here and what he 
wrote elsewhere about transcending the figurative painting.  
 
 32 
3 BACON AND THE FIGURE 
 
In Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze mainly attempts at freeing 
both subject and object from sensation. He insists that in order to fulfil this task 
Bacon employs a certain kind of technique. This is a technique that consists in 
isolating the figure. “In his effort to escape the figurative and representative 
modes of narration and illustration and also the abstractness of pure form, Bacon 
aims at the liberation of the figure through iconic isolation. Through iconic 
isolation, that is, the neutralization of the background and the enclosure of figures 
in well defined spaces, it prevents the figure from telling a story or from 
representing forms external to the canvas” (Boundas 19).  
 
Deleuze argues that by employing such a technique Bacon manages to escape 
from the figurative. This allows him to reveal sensations in his paintings. 
Sensation is what is related not to forms but to forces. According to Deleuze, 
Bacon’s painting aims at the capturing of the force. And sensation, like force, 
brings things together in the very process of separating them. Indeed, sensation is 
both things at once. The same body gives and receives it. This body is both 
subject and object.  
 
Hence, within such a conceptualisation, we are again face to face with 
multiplicities, events and singularities. As in Cinema books, Deleuze attempts to 
get rid of the notions of representation, narration and deep-rooted opposition of 
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subject and object, by substituting this plane of stability with a mobile one that 
consists of intensities, forces and ‘matters of fact’. So again, we are following the 
same route, but in order to have a better understanding of sensations we should 
look for a detailed analysis of Deleuze’s oeuvre on Francis Bacon.  
 
3.1 The Figure and the Field 
 
Bacon draws circles in order to delimit the place. These are special techniques for 
isolating the figure. They “do not consign the Figure to immobility, but on the 
contrary, render a sensible kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure 
within the place, or upon itself” (Francis Bacon 6). Deleuze argues that being 
isolated in such an operative field the Figure becomes an image. Hence, the 
painting becomes an isolated reality. Deleuze writes, “Painting has neither a 
model to represent nor a story to narrate. It has two possible ways of escaping 
from the figurative: either toward pure form, through abstraction; or toward the 
purely figural, through extraction and isolation” (Francis Bacon 6).  
 
To conclude, we may say that there are two possible ways of escaping from the 
figurative painting. One is abstraction and the other is isolation. Bacon employs 
the latter in order to leave the figurative behind for the sake of Figure. And by 
isolation, he also breaks with representation, disrupt narration and escape 
illustration. Instead of intelligible relations of object and ideas he prefers matters 
of fact. Hence, by sticking to the fact Bacon liberates the Figure. This attempt 
constitutes a relationship between distinct figures without narration. Deleuze 
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continues “What fills the rest of the painting will be neither a landscape as the 
correlate of the figure, nor a background from which the form will emerge, nor a 
formless chiaroscuro, a thickness of colour on which shadows would play, a 
texture on which variation would play” (Francis Bacon 7). 
 
According to Deleuze, Francis Bacon has two distinct ways of escaping from the 
figurative. The first one is ‘asignifying traits’ that are devoid of any illustrative or 
narrative function. These are the involuntary free marks lining the canvas. The 
second one is the technique of ‘local wiping’. This is a special technique in which 
the thickness is spread out over a nonfigurative zone by using a rag, handbroom 
or brush. Employing these two techniques, Bacon gets rid of the relation of depth 
or distance between the figure and the field. Also, there appears incertitude of 
light and shadow. This leads to a certain blurriness in Bacon’s painting. This 
blurriness occurs in two ways: 
 
“In the first case, the blur is obtained, not by indistinctness, but on the contrary 
by the operation that ‘consists in destroying clarity by clarity’ as in the man with 
the pig’s head in the Self-portrait of 1973, or the treatment of crumpled 
newspapers…In the other case, the blur is obtained by the techniques of free 
marks or wiping, both of which are also among the precise elements of the 
system” (Francis Bacon 8).  
 
Bacon distinguishes three fundamental elements in his paintings. These are the 
material structure, the circular contour and the raised image. The field and the 
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figure constitute a peculiar relationship in the canvas. What appears is the 
correlation of two sectors on a single plane. This correlation or connection is 
provided by the ring or circle, which is the common limit of both the Figure and 
the field. The figure functions as a background and the Figure functions as a 
form. The coexistence of these two adjacent sectors constitutes an absolutely 
closed and revolving space. 
 
3.2 The Body Escaping From Itself 
 
Deleuze argues that in Bacon’s paintings the contour is the place of an exchange 
in two directions: between the material structure and the Figure, and between the 
Figure and the field. He writes, “If painting has nothing to narrate and no story to 
tell, something is happening all the same, which defines the functioning of the 
painting” (Francis Bacon 11). What is happening is not a representation. There 
are no spectator or spectacles in Bacon’s paintings. The waiting Figures and 
‘attendants’ are not spectators. Deleuze would say that Bacon needs the function 
of a witness, which is not a spectator but part of the figure. He writes: 
 
“In this attempt to eliminate the spectator, the Figure already demonstrates a 
singular athleticism, all the more singular in that the source of the movement is 
not in itself. Instead, the movement goes from the material structure, from the 
field, to the Figure” (Francis Bacon 12). This is the first form of derisory 
athletics in Bacon. The field imprisons and envelops the Figure. It is caught up in 
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a movement that forms itself into a cylinder. This extreme confinement of the 
bodies excludes the spectator. “The material structure curls around the contour in 
order to imprison the Figure, which accompanies the movement of all the 
structure’s forces. It is the extreme solitude of the Figures, the extreme 
confinement of the bodies, which excludes every spectator: the Figure becomes a 
Figure only through this movement which confines it and in which it confines 
itself” (Francis Bacon 12). 
 
Coexisting with the first, the other movement is the movement of the Figure 
toward the material structure, toward the field of colour. The body is not simply 
waiting for something from the structure but it is waiting something from the 
structure. Since it is within the body that something is happening, the body 
becomes the source of movement. Deleuze would say “The body exerts itself in a 
very precise manner, or waits to escape from itself in a very precise manner. It is 
not me that attempts to escape from my body, it is the body that attempts to 
escape from itself by means of…in short, a spasm”(Francis Bacon 12).  
 
The entire series of spasm in Bacon consists of the body attempting to escape 
from itself through one of its organs. The body-figure exerts an intense 
motionless effort upon itself in order to escape. This effort leads to an 
extraordinary pose beyond the strength of the body. For example, the scream is 
the operation that the entire body escapes through the mouth. According to 
Deleuze, this is Bacon’s approximation of horror and abjection. “‘To pass through 
the eye of a needle’, trivializes the very abomination or Destiny. A scene of 
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hysteria. The entire series of spasms in Bacon is of this type: scenes of love, 
scenes of vomit and excrement, in which the body is attempting to escape from 
itself through one of its organs in order to reach the field or material structure” 
(Francis Bacon 13). 
 
There is also a second direction of the exchange in Bacon’s paintings. It is no 
longer the material structure that curls around the contour in order to envelop the 
Figure. Hence, the Figure wants to dissipate into the material structure. This is 
the second form of derisory athletics. The body, either contracts itself by going 
through a whole or stretches itself out in the mirror. In both cases the Figure is 
deformed. The Figure is not simply the isolated body, but also the deformed body 
that escapes from itself. Sometimes it is contracted and aspirated and sometimes 
stretched and dilated.  
 
What is happening in the canvas is immediately related to the Figure. And also 
the deformations are immediately transferred to the Figure. Deleuze writes, “In 
the 1973 Self-portrait of the man with the pig’s head, the deformation takes place 
on the spot. Just as the effort of the body is exerted upon itself, so the 
deformation is static. An intense movement flows through the whole body, a 
deformed and deforming movement that at every moment transfers the real image 
onto the body in order to constitute the Figure” (Francis Bacon 14). Thus, 
Deleuze argues that either by contracting itself by going through a whole or by 
stretching itself out in the mirror, the body returns to the material structure and 
dissipates into it.  
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3.3 Becoming-Animal 
 
In Bacon’s paintings the body appears as the material of the Figure. Deleuze 
insists that this material of the Figure should not be confused with the spatializing 
material structure. Moreover, the body does not have a face. It has the head. 
According to Deleuze, there is a big difference between the two. “For the face is a 
structured, spatial organization that conceals the head, whereas the head is 
dependent upon the body, even if it is the point of the body, its culmination. It is 
not that the head lacks the spirit; but it is a spirit in bodily form, a corporeal and 
vital breath, an animal spirit. It is the animal spirit of man...” (Francis Bacon 15).  
 
Throughout Bacon’s work, the bone seems to belong not to the head but to the 
face. Head appears as the non-localized power of the meat. This power of non-
localization turns all meat into a head without face. What Bacon tries to constitute 
when he is painting Pope is that intense relationship between head and meat. 
Deleuze writes that “the scream that comes out of the Pope’s mouth, and the pity 
that comes out of his eyes, have meat as their object” (Francis Bacon 17). What is 
revealed in the canvas is a head without a face. Hence, the mouth is no longer a 
particular organ. It becomes a hole through which the body escapes. 
 
Thus, Bacon’s attempts can be seen as a determined way of rediscovering the 
head. The deformations which the body undergoes are rendered by techniques of 
wiping and brushing. The face is disorganized by losing its form and the head 
emerges from beneath the face. The wiped-off parts reveal the traits of animality 
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in Bacon’s paintings. Thus, employing these techniques Bacon constitutes ‘a zone 
of indiscernibility, of undecidability between man and animal’.  
 
“Sometimes an animal, for example a real dog, is treated as the shadow of its 
master, or conversely, the man’s shadow itself assumes an autonomous and 
indeterminate animal existence. The shadow escapes from the body like an animal 
we had been sheltering” (Francis Bacon 15). However, what is painted in the 
canvas is not the combination of two forms. Deleuze calls it a’common fact’. This 
zone of indiscernibility reveals the common fact of both man and animal. 
 
Within this zone of indiscernibility the bones of the body appears as the spatial 
structure of the body. It is just the flesh and meat what is displayed in the canvas. 
For Bacon, there is a distinction between flesh and bone. Deleuze argues that “the 
body is revealed only when it ceases to be supported by the bones, when the flesh 
ceases to cover the bones, when the two exist for each other, but each on its own 
terms: the bone as the material structure of the body, the flesh as the bodily 
material of the Figure” (Francis Bacon 16). Furthermore, this zone of 
indiscernibility creates a tension between flesh and bone. Meat is that which 
realizes this tension. In meat, the flesh descends from the bone. And the bones 
rise up out of the flesh. 
 
This tension between flesh and bone creates a movement which Deleuze calls ‘the 
acrobatics of the flesh’. “Well beyond the apparent sadism, the bones are like a 
trapeze apparatus upon which the flesh is the acrobat. The athleticism of the body 
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is naturally prolonged in this acrobatics of the flesh” (Francis Bacon 16). 
However, he argues that although meat, retaining all the sufferings of the body, 
appears as the chief object of Bacon’s pity it also manifests this acrobatics and 
delightful invention. Meat is not the dead flesh. It is the common zone of man and 
the beast. And it is in this sense, Deleuze states that every man who suffers is a 
piece of meat. 
 
He continues by declaring that this common zone does not lead to a resemblance 
but a deep identity. This zone of indiscernibility constitutes a deep identity of 
man and the beast. Hence, the man who suffers is a beast and the beast that 
suffers is a man. This is why Deleuze states that “this discarded meat is we 
ourselves and the spectator is already in the spectacle” (Francis Bacon 17). For 
him, this is the reality of becoming.  
 
3.4 Sensations 
 
The Figure is the sensible form linked to a sensation. Abstract form acts upon 
brain whereas the Figure immediately acts upon nervous system. Deleuze argues 
that sensation has two faces. One is turned towards the subject and the other 
towards the object. It is the same body that both gives and receives the sensation. 
“As a spectator, I experience the sensation only by entering into the painting, by 
reaching the unity of the sensation and that which senses it, the unity of the 
sensing and the sensed” (Francis Bacon 23). Deleuze insists that sensation is in 
the body, it is what is painted. So, according to Bacon, to paint the sensation is to 
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record the fact. Thus, what is painted is no more a representation of a body. It 
becomes the sole experience of the sustained sensation. 
 
The idea of such an experience has some resonances with the notion of duration 
in Bergson’s theses on movement. It also interferes with the direct image of time 
in cinematography. As we have mentioned, what we see in screen is not only the 
represented objects which is framed by the cinematographic apparatus but also a 
peculiar perception of time or duration, which is haunted by singularities, 
sensations and multiplicities. Thus, what Deleuze attempts to pose in Cinema is 
just another way of looking at that ‘reality of becoming’. 
 
For Bacon, in figurative painting the form is related to an object that it is 
supposed to represent. Indeed, this is the essential nature of figuration. However, 
in Bacon’s works the form is related to the sensation. Sensation avoids the detour 
and boredom of conveying a story. It is transmitted directly. It passes from one 
level to another. In this respect, Deleuze asserts that figurative and abstract 
painting acts indirectly. “They pass through the head, they do not act directly 
upon the nervous system, they do not attain the sensation, they do not extract the 
Figure – all because they remain at one and the same level. They can implement 
transformations of form, but they cannot attain deformations of bodies” (Francis 
Bacon 24). 
 
Each painting is a shifting sequence. It is constituted by the different orders of the 
same sensation. Each sensation exists in different levels. Deleuze asserts that 
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“...there are not sensations of different orders, but different orders of one and the 
same sensation. It is the nature of sensation to envelop a constitutive difference of 
level, a plurality of constituting domains. Every sensation, and every Figure, is 
already an ‘accumulated’ or ‘coagulated’ sensation, as in a limestone figure” 
(Francis Bacon 24). The idea presupposes that each sensation has several levels 
and there is a synthetic unity between them.  
 
3.5 Levels of Sensation 
 
According to Deleuze, the synthetic unity of sensation can be explained in 
compliance with four diverse hypothesis. However, the first three consists of 
elements that lead to figuration and representation. The first hypothesis takes the 
figured thing as the source of this unity. In other words, the idea implies that the 
represented object itself creates the synthetic unity of sensation. However, since 
the Figure intends to break with the figurative, the sensation must have nothing of 
the nature of a represented object.  
 
Deleuze argues that the violence of sensation is opposed to the violence of the 
represented. Although it is inevitable to break with the figuration completely 
“Bacon has not ceased trying to eliminate the ‘sensational’, that is, the primary 
figuration of things that provoke a violent sensation…The Pope himself sees 
nothing, and screams before the invisible. Thus neutralized, the horror is 
multiplied because it is inferred from the scream, and not the reverse. And 
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certainly it is not easy to renounce the horror or the primary figuration” (Francis 
Bacon 25).  
 
The second hypothesis confuses sensation with feelings. So when we assert that 
there are different levels we seem to cause ambivalence. For Deleuze, an 
ambivalence in the Figure refers to the feelings it experiences in relation to the 
represented things. However, there are no feelings in Bacon. His attempt is not to 
create a multitude of ambivalent feelings or to record different levels of feeling in 
one image. Bacon paints sensations, namely, affects. Deleuze continues: 
 
“There is a third, more interesting, hypothesis. The levels of sensation would be 
like snapshots or momentary instants of movement, which would recompose 
movement synthetically, in all its continuity, speed, and violence, as in synthetic 
cubism, futurism, or Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase” (Francis Bacon 
26). This is the same problem that Bergson poses when he asserts that movement 
cannot be reconstituted by adding immobile instants under the conception of an 
abstract time.  
 
Deleuze would say that movement does not explain sensation. On the contrary, 
movement is explained by it. Sometimes there appears a movement of translation 
that is caused by the action of invisible forces upon the body. For this reason, 
Deleuze argues that it is the levels of sensation that explain what remains of 
movement. “According to the law of Beckett or Kafka, there is an immobility 
beyond movement: beyond standing up, there is sitting down; beyond sitting 
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down, there is lying down; and beyond that, one finally disappears. The true 
acrobat is one who is consigned to immobility inside the circle” (Francis Bacon 
26).  
 
And finally Deleuze asserts the last hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes an 
originary unity of senses in relation to a Figure that is multisensible. “The levels 
of sensation would be actual domains of sensation that refer to the different sense 
organs; but every level or domain would have a way of referring to the others, 
independent of the represented object they have in common. There would be an 
existential communication between a color, a taste, a touch, an odor, a noise, a 
weight, which would constitute the “pathic” (nonrepresentative) moment of the 
sensation” (Francis Bacon 25).  
 
The unity of the senses is actualized with a presupposition of a vital power which 
exceeds every domain. For Deleuze, this power is Rhythm, which appears as a 
nonrational, noncerebral ‘logic of senses’. Thus, the idea behind the synthetic 
unity of sensation and diverse levels or domains of one and the same sensation is 
explained by this relation between rhythm and sensation. Deleuze concludes: 
 
“This rhythm flows through a painting just as it flows through a piece of music. It 
is diastolic-systolic: the world that takes me in by closing around the ego, the ego 
that is open to the world, and the open itself. Cézanne, it is said, is the one who 
put a vital rhythm into the visual sensation. Could the same be said of Bacon, 
with his coexistent movements, when the field closes in around the Figure, and 
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when the Figure contracts or, on the contrary, stretches out in order to get back to 
the field, until it merges with it?” (Francis Bacon 27).  
 
3.6 Going Beyond Organism 
 
According to Deleuze, the rhythmic unity of the senses is discovered by going 
beyond organism. At the limit of the lived body and beyond organism we confront 
with a diverse kind of body. That is the notion of ‘body without organs’, which 
Deleuze quote from Antonin Artaud. It stands amid where the levels of sensation 
conjoin. It acts like a plane where sensation and rhythm passes through. “The 
body without organs is opposed less to organs than to that organization of organs 
that we call organism. It is an intense and intensive body. It is traversed by a 
wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to the variations of its 
amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds and levels” 
(Francis Bacon 27).  
 
Deleuze asserts that the Figure in Bacon is the body without organs. It is just 
flesh and nerve. A wave flows through this body and it traces levels upon it. 
When the wave encounters the forces acting on this body a sensation is produced. 
“When sensation is linked to the body in this way, it ceases to be representative 
and becomes real; and cruelty will be linked less and less to the representation of 
something horrible, and will become nothing other than the action of forces upon 
the body, or sensation (Francis Bacon 27). 
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For Bacon, organism is what imprisons life. Therefore, the Figure in his works 
appears as a whole non-organic life. “No mouth. No tongue. No teeth. No larynx. 
No esophagus. No belly. No anus”. According to Deleuze, it is similar to the 
notion of powerful non-organic life in Gothic Art. The Gothic Art is opposed to 
the organic representation of Classical Art. “Classical Art can be figurative, 
insofar as it refers to something represented, but it can also be abstract, when it 
extricates a geometric form from the representation. But the pictorial line in 
Gothic painting is completely different, as it is geometry and figure…It is a 
geometry no longer in the service of the essential and eternal, but a geometry in 
the service of ‘problems’ or ‘accidents’, ablation, adjunction, projection, 
intersection” (Francis Bacon 29). 
 
Body without organs lacks the particular organization of organs. Hence, it appears 
as an indeterminate organ. This indeterminacy emerges for the sake of provisional 
presence of determinate organs. In other words, when the wave flows through the 
body, an organ is determined depending on the force it encounters. The organ will 
change its function and structure if the force itself changes. This is why the body 
without organs is defined by the temporary and provisional presence of 
determinate organs. For Deleuze, this process is one way of introducing time into 
painting. This is how Bacon put time inside the Figure. 
 
The body without organs can be articulated as the hysterical reality of the body. 
The organs become temporary and transitory. The same organ acts differently 
under the action of different forces. Organ loses its determinate character and 
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becomes transitory. It is determined according to the levels of sensation or 
according to the forces that are exerted upon it. “It is no longer my head, but I 
feel myself inside a head, I see and I see myself in the body that I see, and I see 
myself in this naked body when I am dressed…and so forth” (Francis Bacon 30).  
 
This is the way the body escapes from itself. “It escapes from itself through the 
open mouth, through the anus or the stomach, or through the throat, or through 
the circle of the washbasin, or through the point of the umbrella. The presence of 
a body without organs under the organism, the presence of transitory organs 
under the organic representation” (Francis Bacon 31). According to Deleuze, 
within such a composition a hysteresis is breaking off the work each time. 
Challenging the notions of before and after and intensifying the excessive 
presence of the Figure, the hysteresis interrupts the figurative course of the work.  
 
But what is this hysteresis? And what is the relation between hysteria and 
presence? Deleuze argues that “the hysteric is at the same time someone who 
imposes his or her presence, but also someone for whom things and beings are 
present, too present, and who attributes to everything and communicates to every 
being this excessive presence” (Francis Bacon 31). For Deleuze, in Bacon the 
whole painting is hystericized. The figure and the whole painting is caught up in 
an excessive presence. In the canvas, there is a presence acting directly on the 
nervous system, which makes representation impossible.  
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“There is a special relation between painting and hysteria. It is very simple. 
Painting directly attempts to release the presences beneath representation, beyond 
representation. The color system itself is a system of direct action on the nervous 
system. This is not a hysteria of the painter, but hysteria of painting. With 
painting, hysteria becomes art. Or rather, with the painter, hysteria becomes 
painting” (Francis Bacon 31). Painting is what converts hysteria. It makes 
presence immediately visible. It liberates not only lines and colors from their 
representative function but also the eye from its adherence to the organism. 
Hence, the eye is no more fixed and qualified organ. It becomes a polyvalent 
indeterminate organ.  
 
“This is the double definition of painting: subjectively, it invests the eye, which 
ceases to be organic in order to become a polyvalent and transitory organ: 
objectively, it brings before us the reality of a body, of lines and colors freed 
from organistic representation. And each is produced by the other: the pure 
presence of the body becomes visible at the same time that the eye becomes the 
destined organ of this presence” (Francis Bacon 32). The Figure appears within 
the identity of an already-there and an always-delayed. This identity is situated in 
an interminable presence. Indeed, it is the body without organs that acts as a pure 
presence, in the lack of any permanent determination. This notion of pure 
presence will certainly take us to the plane of Deleuzian haecceities.  
 
The painting is no longer a collection of objects that is represented but rather a 
plane in which incorporeal events merge. It is composed of infinities, which are 
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always in a state of becoming. Unlike the traditional painting that is based on 
representation and figuration of things and beings, Bacon’s work aims at 
constituting a multitude of domains that is composed of affects or sensations, 
namely, events. The Figure insinuates a movement that is caused by the invisible 
forces exerted upon itself. The multiplicity of incorporeal beings and forces 
acting upon them constitutes a field of becoming. This is where sensations merge. 
 
The things and facts exist in time. But events rather subsist or insist. They are 
incorporeal effects that are coextensive with the unlimited Aeon. The infinitely 
divisible event is both that which has just happened and that which is about to 
happen at once. Moreover, it is neither active nor passive. It is in between. It is 
the common result of both. The event is in a state of becoming rather than a state 
of stasis or being.   
 
Deleuze argues that the Stoics discovered the surface effects. Instead of depths 
and heights of Platonic tradition they prefer surfaces. Seen from that respect, the 
most concealed becomes the most manifest in Stoic terminology. “Everything 
now returns to the surface. This is the result of the Stoic operation: the unlimited 
returns. Becoming-mad, becoming unlimited is no longer a ground which 
rumbles. It climbs to the surface of things and becomes passive. It is no longer a 
question of simulacra which elude the ground and insinuate themselves 
everywhere, but rather a question of effects which manifest themselves and act in 
their place” (Logic of Sense 7). 
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The surface effects in Bacon emerge with the help of special techniques in Bacon. 
Employing the techniques of a-signifying traits and wiping-off Bacon attempts to 
get rid of the figurative givens and probabilities that occupy and preoccupy the 
canvas. In order not to represent an object or narrate a story, he creates 
‘diagrams’. Deleuze exemplifies: “It is precisely these givens that will be 
removed, whether wiped, swept, or rubbed, or else recovered, by the act of 
painting…the head: part of it is cleared away with a brush, a broom, a sponge, or 
a rag. This is what Bacon calls a ‘graph’ or a Diagram” (Francis Bacon 55). 
Stretching or elongating some part of the body in a painting creates a diagram. 
Being removed from the figurative givens the canvas turns out to be a plane of 
incorporealities. 
 
According to Deleuze, shattering the optical sovereign organization Bacon 
transforms his work into a catastrophe. What is painted, turns out to be a chaos. 
The canvas is full of accidental marks and one can no longer see anything. “These 
traits are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are non-
representative, non-illustrative, non-narrative. They are no longer either 
significant or signifiers: they are a-signifying traits. They are traits of sensation, 
but of confused sensations” (Francis Bacon 55).  
 
Therefore, Deleuze argues that the diagram in Bacon functions as an operative set 
of a-signifying and non-representative lines and zones, traits and patches. The 
function of the diagram is to be suggestive. To be suggestive means to introduce 
possibilities of fact. Although these accidental and involuntary marks create 
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possibilities of fact they do not constitute a fact. They should be utilized. “To be 
converted into a fact, to evolve into a Figure, they must be re-injected into a 
visual whole; but it is precisely through the action of these marks that the visual 
whole will lose its optical organization, and will give the eye another power, and 
at the same time an object that will no longer be figurative” (Francis Bacon 56).  
 
Deleuze argues that it is the diagram, being a catastrophe, a violent chaos in 
relation to the figurative givens, which unlocks areas of sensation in the paintings 
of Francis Bacon. Being wiped, swept or rubbed with involuntary, accidental 
marks and a-signifying traits, the Figure always appears as a deformed body 
escaping from itself. The body returns to the material structure and dissipates into 
it.  Hence, by losing its contours it integrates into something. This ‘something’ 
may be seen as concrete duration, namely, the whole.  
 
This ever-changing whole is where the multiplicity of forces acts. Bacon’s 
painting aims at capturing forces not forms. Forces exist as intensities. These 
intensities are where the tension appears. This tension produces sensations. 
Boundas argues that “now we understand what allows Deleuze to think of 
sensation in terms of different orders and levels: it is the fact that forces are 
intensities and therefore qualified as either high or low. Intensity permits us to 
talk about the multiplicity of sensation without having to appeal to many 
sensations” (Boundas 19).  
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Indeed, it is the reality of becoming, which is unceasingly integrated into the 
whole. This process refers to opening of a whole which endures, and whose 
movements are so many mobile sections crossing the closed systems. This is 
where the levels of sensation appear. In Bacon’s paintings everything seems 
restrained. But it is something that is going to happen. The tension is always 
there. This tension is the movement. And through that movement the whole is 
divided up into objects and objects are re-united in the whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
4 NEW MEDIA 
 
The scope of new media technologies ranges a broad sphere which consists of 
web sites, virtual worlds, virtual reality, human-computer interfaces, multimedia, 
interactive installations, computer animation, computer games, digital video, 
cinema, internet, digital imaging, 3-D modeling and information architecture. 
Covering all these fields new media somehow lacks a compact definition. The 
question ‘What is new media?’ always seems problematic.  
 
This is, perhaps, because that we are in the beginning of a new age, in which new 
media technologies start to challenge our very notions of knowledge, information 
and communication. New media tends to transform not only the way we look and 
interpret phenomena, but also the way we act, work, play, communicate, and 
consume. Indeed, new media aims at a transformation of many fundamental parts 
of life. Within a decade it even changed the way we think about our personal and 
collective identities.  
 
Thus, new media appears as an ongoing discovery for us. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to attain some salient tendencies. At first glance, new media seems to 
involve complex integration of hardware, software and existing media elements 
into a single application. It employs elements from broadcasting, publishing, 
entertainment, telecommunications and information technology. Combining audio 
and video elements with text, graphics and animation, new media offers 
integration of a variety of applications that existing media could hardly handle.    
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Throughout the following part, rather than analyzing a particular application of 
new media, I will try to address a general view of it. My aim will be to determine 
some basic characteristics, that is, essentials of new media technologies. I will 
mostly refer to Lev Manovich’s book, The Language of New Media. That will 
give us a comprehensive account of the underlying principles of new media. 
However, in some parts I will oppose Manovich’s arguments. Yet, it will be 
necessary to put on a critical approach while elaborating the issues concerning 
Manovich’s text. 
 
4.1 Salient Tendencies 
 
According to Manovich, new media represents a convergence of two separate 
trajectories. These are computing and media technologies. “Both begin in the 
1830s with Babbage’s Analytical Engine and Daguerre’s daguerreotype. 
Eventually, in the middle of the twentieth century, a modern digital computer is 
developed to perform calculations on numerical data more efficiently; it takes 
over from numerous mechanical tabulators and calculators widely employed by 
companies and governments since the turn of the century. In a parallel movement, 
we witness the rise of modern media technologies that allow the storage of 
images, image sequences, sounds, and text using different material forms – 
photographic plates, film stocks, gramophone records, etc.” (Manovich 20). 
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Therefore, new media emerges via the synthesis of these two histories. It is based 
on the translation of all existing media into numerical data. Manovich proposes 
five principles in order to differentiate new media from the old one. These 
principles are: numerical representation, modularity, automation, variability, and 
cultural transcoding.  
 
4.1.1 Numerical Representation  
 
The principle of numerical representation reveals the formal character of new 
media objects. Accordingly, we may assert that all new media objects are 
composed of digital code. Thus, they can be described mathematically. They are 
subject to algorithmic manipulation, which renders media programmable. 
Manovich exemplifies: “for instance, by applying appropriate algorithms, we can 
automatically remove ‘noise’ from a photograph, improve its contrast, locate the 
edges of the shapes, or change its proportions” (Manovich 27).  
 
We can also convert various forms of old media into the form of new media, that 
is, numerical representation. This process is called digitization, and it involves 
transforming analog data into digital data. Digitization consists of two parts. 
“First, data is sampled, most often at regular intervals, such as the grid of pixels 
used to represent a digital image. The frequency of sampling is referred to as 
resolution. Sampling turns continuous data into discrete data, that is, data 
occurring in distinct units: people, the pages of a book, pixels. Second, each step 
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is quantified, that is, it is assigned a numerical value drawn from a defined range 
(Manovich 28). 
 
4.1.2 Modularity 
 
According to the principle of modularity, each new media object maintain it 
separate identity within every process it undergoes. Any new media object can be 
combined to larger objects without losing its independence. In other words, a new 
media object has the same modular structure throughout. Each new media object 
consists of independent parts, which can be represented as collections of discrete 
samples. 
 
The structure of an HTML document can be given as a good example of 
modularity. An HTML text consists of a number of separate elements. GIF and 
JPEG images, Flash movies, MPEG movie clips and/or text are all stored 
independently. Yet, by the execution of the page all seems to combine and work 
in a unity. Also, the World Wide Web is an example of modular structure. It 
consists of various web pages each consisting of separate media elements. 
Though these elements are stored independently as fractal structures they can all 
be assembled into larger systems. These modular parts can be accessed, modified, 
or substituted without affecting the overall structure. Manovich asserts: 
 
“…Deleting parts of new media does not render it meaningless. In fact, the 
modular structure of new media makes such deletion and substitution of parts 
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particularly easy. For example, since an HTML document consists of a number of 
separate objects each represented by a line of HTML code, it is very easy to 
delete, substitute, or add new objects. Similarly, since in Photoshop the parts of a 
digital image usually kept placed on separate layers, these parts can be deleted 
and substituted with a click of a button” (Manovich 31). 
 
4.1.3 Automation 
 
The third principle is automation. It can be seen as a consequence of the two 
previous principles. It is the self-generated ability of a computer-controlled 
device to assemble information from databases and format it using generic 
templates and scripts. Put differently, it is the self-automated process of 
computer-based technologies for employing various algorithms to data structures. 
Manovich distinguishes between two types of automation. The first one is the 
low-level automation. Programs of word processing, presentation, web creation 
and image editing employ diverse levels of low-level automation.  
 
The second type is the high-level automation, which is determined by the capacity 
of a computer to understand the meanings embedded in the objects being 
generated. This type of automation is mostly employed in projects of Artificial 
Intelligence and Artificial Life. “Other computer programs can automatically 
generate 3-D objects such as trees, landscapes, and human figures as well as 
detailed ready-to-use animations of complex natural phenomena such as fire and 
 58 
waterfalls. In Hollywood films, flocks of birds, ant colonies, and crowds of 
people are automatically created by AL (artificial life) software” (Manovich 32).  
 
4.1.4 Variability  
 
Variability is the fourth principle. This also appears as a consequence of the first 
two principles: numerical coding of media and the modular structure of a media 
object. It is the most crucial principle within the context of this thesis. Yet, I will 
give a general account of it in accordance with Manovich’s text and leave the 
discussion to the next part of this chapter. 
 
Manovich asserts “Old media involved human creator who manually assembled 
textual, visual, and/or audio elements into particular composition or sequence. 
This sequence was stored in some material, its order determined once and for all. 
Numerous copies could be run off from the master, and…they were all identical. 
New media, in contrast, is characterized by variability. Instead of identical 
copies, a new media object typically gives rise to many different versions” 
(Manovich 36).  
 
Hence, a new media object is not something fixed once and for all. It can exist in 
potentially infinite versions. The elements of new media maintain their separate 
identities while they are assembled into numerous sequences. The new media 
object exist not as a material object but as a discrete sample of data that can be 
sent through wires at the speed of light. The application of customized web pages 
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that are immediately assembled by the main server can be seen as an example to 
the variability principle of new media. Furthermore, according to Manovich, we 
can trace particular cases of this principle almost in every application of new 
media technologies. I will discuss some of these implementations. 
 
Elements of new media are stored in a media database. A media database is a 
collection of structured data. A variety of end-user objects can be generated from 
this database. Indeed, creating a work in new media can be understood as the 
construction of an interface to a database. The interface is that which provides 
access to the underlying database. Seen from that aspect, we may argue that a 
number of different interfaces can be generated from the same data. In old media, 
there is no separation such as the interface and the database. Since the level of an 
interface did not exist, the work and the interface were the same. However, with 
new media, the content of the work and the interface are separated. Thus, it is 
possible to create different interfaces to the same material. 
 
Another implementation of variability principle is customization. “Information 
about the user can be used by a computer program to customize automatically the 
media composition as well as to create elements themselves. Example(s)…web 
sites use information about the type of hardware and browser or user’s network 
address to customize automatically the site the user will see…” (Manovich 37). 
 
Menu-based interactivity can be seen as a particular case of this customization. It 
is also called branching-type interactivity. “When the user reaches a particular 
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object, the program presents her with choices and allows her to choose among 
them. Depending on the value chosen, the user advances along the particular 
branch of the tree” (Manovich 38). Hypermedia can be seen as another 
implementation, which is similar to the branching-type interactivity. In 
hypermedia, the multimedia elements are connected through hyperlinks. The 
World Wide Web is a particular application of hypermedia throughout a global 
network.  
 
Manovich puts scalability forward as the most basic cases of variability principle. 
It is based upon the idea that different versions of the same media object can be 
generated at various sizes and levels of detail. “The metaphor of a map is useful 
in thinking about the scalability principle. If we equate a new media object with 
physical territory, different versions of this object are like maps of this territory 
generated at different scales. Depending on the scale chosen, a map provides 
more or less detail about the territory” (Manovich 38). Full-size image and its 
icon in Adobe Photoshop, full text and its shorter version in Microsoft Word, 
different versions of a web site that is chosen according to the connection speed 
of Internet. All these can be seen as examples of variability principle.  
 
4.1.5 Cultural Transcoding 
 
The last and the most substantial principle of new media according to Manovich 
is cultural transcoding. In the context of new media, to transcode something is to 
translate it into another format. Hence, transcoding in new media implies the 
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translation of diverse processes between algorithms and data structure into ‘user-
friendly’ arrangements, or vice versa. Seen from that aspect, such a translation is 
supposed to bridge two diverse types of organization. Manovich argues: 
 
“While from one point of view, computerized media still displays structural 
organization that makes sense to its human users – images feature recognizable 
objects; text files consist of grammatical sentences; virtual spaces are defined 
along the familiar Cartesian coordinate system; and so on – from another point of 
view, its structure now follows the established conventions of the computer’s 
organization of data. Examples of these conventions are different data structures 
such as lists, records, and arrays; the already-mentioned substitution of all 
constants by variables; the separation between algorithms and data structures; and 
modularity” (Manovich 45).  
 
According to Manovich, transcoding also appears as a conceptual transfer from 
computer world to culture. It leads to a transformation of cultural categories and 
concepts. Furthermore, within this new context of new media technologies, 
computerized images, sounds, texts and graphics had to be reconceptualized. 
Manovich elaborates the structure of a computer image: 
 
“On the level of representation, it belongs on the human side of culture, 
automatically entering in dialog with other images, other cultural ‘semes’ and 
‘mythemes’. But on another level, it is a computer file that consists of a machine-
readable header, followed by numbers representing color values of its pixels. On 
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this level it enters into dialog with other computer files. The dimensions of this 
dialog are not the image’s content, meanings, or formal qualities, but rather file 
size, file type, type of compression used, file format, and so on. In short, these 
dimensions belong to the computer’s own cosmogony rather than to human 
culture” (Manovich 46).  
 
Since computerization turns media into computer data this should have been done 
in compliance with a principle. For Manovich, such a principle should be based 
upon an established dialogue between humanity and computerized machinery. 
There should be a necessary and essential way of transcoding between the human 
users and the computers. Only by adopting this way of transcoding, it becomes 
possible to assemble a coordination between human culture and computerized 
media technologies.  
 
4.2 The Dichotomy  
 
I propose that Manovich’s argument on transcoding seems problematic in two 
ways. At first glance, the problematic issue appears within the boundaries of new 
media. Manovich opens a split within new media by positing it as consisting of 
two distinct layers. These are the cultural layer and the computer layer. The 
categories of cultural layers can be exemplified as plot, composition, point of 
view, etc. Examples of categories in the computer layer are processes and 
operations that are based on computer language, algorithms and data structure. 
Then he adds that these two layers influence and transform each other. 
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He argues, “because new media is created on computers, distributed via 
computers, and stored and archived on computers, the logic of a computer can be 
expected to significantly influence the traditional cultural logic of media; that is, 
we may expect that the computer layer will affect the cultural layer” (Manovich 
46). This way of affection is what he calls transcoding. Seen from that aspect, 
Manovich tries to resolve the opposition by inserting the notion of cultural 
transcoding, which occurs between these two distinct layers. 
 
However, a second and more attentive look will reveal that the first opposition of 
the cultural layer and the computer layer, in fact, depends upon another one, 
which exceeds outside of new media. This is the inevitable dichotomy between 
the real world of us and the virtual world of computers, which is presupposed by 
Manovich’s approach. The dichotomy is inevitable in the sense that the very 
language of The Language of New Media is weaved by notions such as 
‘computer’s own cosmogony’, ‘computer’s ontology’, ‘computerized 
representation of reality’, etc. In other words, Manovich’s text is based upon the 
duality of the human world and the computer world. 
 
Manovich’s conceptualization of new media resembles the notion of root-book, 
which is articulated by Deleuze and Guattari in ‘Rhizome’, the magnificent 
overture of A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze puts the root-book as the classical 
book which is noble and signifying. He argues “the book imitates the world, as art 
imitates nature: by procedures specific to it that accomplish what nature cannot or 
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can no longer do. The law of the book is the law of reflection, the One that 
becomes two. How could the law of the book reside in nature, when it is what 
presides over the very division between the world and book, nature and art? 
(Deleuze and Guattari 5).  
 
In fact, Manovich attempts to assign a language to new media by employing 
concepts that are originated by the reflection of new media itself upon the outer 
reality. What he calls the computerization of culture is the assimilation of this 
language via cultural transcoding. He defines how computerization of culture 
accomplishes this transcoding: “Cultural codes and concepts are substituted, on 
the level of meaning, and/or language, by new ones that derive from the 
computer’s ontology, epistemology, and pragmatics. New media thus acts as a 
forerunner of this more general process of cultural reconceptualization” 
(Manovich 47). 
 
I propose that Manovich’s attempt to attain a language and/or meaning for new 
media is motivated by a drive to capture the phenomena, which is in a state of 
constant flux. Such an attempt involves a process of translation, which employs 
new media to organize, store, transmit and transform meaning into digits and 
codes. And such an approach will eventually end up in a computerized version of 
the ‘oldest illusion’. Again, we miss the movement, change and transformation 
for the sake of abstraction, analysis and immobility.  
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Yet, new media gives us also a chance to think again the nature of becoming and 
change. An unstructured, non-hierarchical and open model of new media seems to 
create a plane of immanence that consists of multiplicities, singularities, and body 
without organs. In this sense, it emerges as the affirmation of Deleuzian thought 
with its rhizomic structure, in which new connections and arrangements are 
constructed and deconstructed unceasingly. In order to elaborate the issue, I will 
discuss the notions of database, algorithm, web and hypernarrative coextensively 
with rhizomic structures, forces, body without organs, events and singularities. 
 
4.3 Becoming and New Media  
 
Dealing with new media, we first encounter with the notion of digitization. It is 
the process of converting analog data to digital data. Secondly, we confront the 
notion of common code. Attaining a common code for every application, different 
media can be combined into a single digital file. And lastly, numerical 
representation turns media into computable data and makes it programmable. 
 
Programmability involves a sequential process run through algorithms. An 
algorithm is that which specifies the sequence of steps to be performed on any 
data. This data is stored in a media database. And access to this underlying 
process is provided by the interface. All the processes and applications of new 
media are obtained by the integration of these three elements with each other. 
Manovich exemplifies this collaboration as follows: “…For instance, when the 
user applies a particular Photoshop filter to an image, the main Photoshop 
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programs invoke a separate program that corresponds to this filter. The program 
reads in the pixel values, performs some actions on them, and writes modified 
values to the screen” (Manovich 121). 
 
Data structures and algorithms are software objects that are complementary to 
each other. Algorithm is the final sequence of simple operations that a computer 
can execute in order to accomplish a given task. A data structure is the data 
organized in a particular way for efficient search and retrieval. According to the 
principle of modularity, individual elements always retain their individual 
identity. Retaining such individuality, they can be wired together into more than 
one object.  
 
Moreover, new media objects are constituted as variables rather than constants. In 
compliance with the variability principle, we may assert that a computer 
substitutes every constant with a variable. Manovich adds: “In designing all 
functions and data structures, a computer programmer tries always to use 
variables rather than constants. On the level of human-computer interface, this 
principle means that the user is given many options to modify the performance of 
a program or a media object, be it a computer game, Web site, Web browser, or 
the operating system itself” (Manovich 44). 
 
Size, shape, color, format and degree of detail are all variables. They can be 
modified in accordance with a specific application. Furthermore, they keep their 
independence and separate identity in every process they undergo. Seen from that 
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aspect, a new media object appears as that which resists any absolute 
identification. Instead of being confined to a single identity, a new media object 
retains a potentially open and unstable identity.  
 
Therefore, new media objects act like unique individuals that are employed and 
operated through provisional organization. Put differently, new media consists of 
temporary organizations, which are generated from indeterminate variables. The 
diverse elements are processed and organized without losing their separate 
identities and independence. Hence, it appears as a plane of immanence, in which 
new arrangements and connections are established unceasingly.  
 
The elements in new media do not possess any determinate function. It is in this 
sense that they act like body-without-organs, which lack any particular 
organization. They are like bodies that lose their determinate character and 
become transitory. Just like the organs act differently under the action of different 
forces, the elements of new media acts in accordance with the algorithm 
performed. Hence, various operations that are based on algorithms can be seen as 
forces traversing bodies, namely, indeterminate data.  
 
4.3.1 Database 
 
A database is the structured collection of data. It is the collection of items on 
which various operations can be performed. There are different types of 
databases: hierarchical, network, object-oriented, etc. Each uses a different model 
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to organize data. “For instance, the records in hierarchical databases are 
organized in a tree-like structure. Object-oriented databases store complex data 
structures, called ‘objects’, which are organized into hierarchical classes that may 
inherit properties from classes higher in the chain” (Manovich 218).  
 
However, navigating a database of a new media object we experience an 
unstructured collection of images, sounds, texts and data. Such an experience is 
different from the one we have when we are reading a book or watching a film. 
Manovich argues, “after the novel, and subsequently cinema, privileged narrative 
as the key form of cultural expression of the modern age, the computer age 
introduces its correlate – the database” (Manovich 218). 
 
Indeed, new media, instead of a sequential narrative we are presented with a 
database of images, sounds, texts and graphics which can be navigated in a 
variety of ways. Therefore, offering alternative ways of expression, new media 
breaks down the hegemony of linear narrative structures. “Many new media 
objects do not tell stories; they do not have a beginning or end; in fact, they do 
not have any development, thematically, formally, or otherwise that would 
organize their elements into a sequence. Instead, they are collections of individual 
items, with every item possessing the same significance as any other” (Manovich 
218).  
 
Seen from that aspect, within that unstructured and non-narrative organization, a 
new media object may seem to be composed of rhizomic arrangements. Retaining 
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its own individuality and significance, every item acts like a machinic structure 
that can be rearranged within different operations. As Deleuze and Guattari argue: 
“A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on 
one of its old lines, or on new lines. You can never get rid of ants because they 
form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been 
destroyed” (Deleuze and Guattari 9).  
 
Thus, database appears as a territory of information in which all data exists in a 
continual present. It becomes a plane of immanence where events, singularities 
and endless juxtapositions between indeterminate data occur.  
 
4.3.2 Logic of the Web 
 
Web pages appear as collections of separate elements which are located within a 
network. Elements such as texts, sounds, graphics, images and also links to other 
pages are edited in such a way that they preserve their separate identities while 
they are composited together into a single object. Seen from that aspect, a web 
page appears as a sequential list of these separate elements that can be edited and 
rearranged in potentially infinite ways. 
 
This is what Manovich calls the ‘open nature of the web’. Since it is always 
possible to add new elements to the list, a web page is that which cannot be 
closed or concluded. Thus, it appears as a plane that is open and always in a state 
of change and transformation. Manovich argues “ the open nature of the Web as a 
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medium means that Web sites never have to be complete; and they rarely are. 
They always grow. New links are continually added to what is already there. It is 
easy to add new elements to the end of a list as it is to insert them anywhere in it. 
All this further contributes to the anti-narrative logic of the Web. If new elements 
are being added over time, the result is a collection, not a story” (Manovich 221). 
 
Hence, in particular applications of new media, we see that the linear narrative, as 
the old way of expression, leaves its place to another type of narrative. It is the 
hypernarrative. It depends upon interactivity. The user plays an active role in 
determining the order in which already generated elements are accessed. A 
hypernarrative emerges as the sum of multiple trajectories through a database 
whereas the linear narrative is only one among many other possible trajectories.  
 
Seen from that aspect, we are confronted with multiplicities with their folded 
arrangements and assemblages. It creates a realm that is always in a state of flux. 
And every quantitative change concerning the numbers of connections and 
arrangements leads to a qualitative change in the whole. The whole is determined 
by the relations of parts in the web. And it appears as that which is open and 
which is in an endless transformation. Deleuze and Guattari write: 
 
“Multiplicities are rhizomatic…A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only 
determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number 
without the multiplicity changing in nature…An assemblage is precisely this 
increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as 
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it expands its connections. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as 
those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 8).  
 
4.3.3 New Ways of Thinking 
 
Structural computer programming involves a collaboration of various programs 
that are constituted by small and self-sufficient modules, which employs various 
functions or scripts. Each module has its own function, but it is also in direct 
relation to the whole program. For instance, scripts are the mechanisms that 
control various repeated actions in an operation. Besides its peculiar function 
each script is employed by the larger scripts it is assembled. However, such 
structural models lack the type of modularity that new media objects retain. If a 
particular module of the program is deleted, the program will not run. This is the 
way that structural programs operate.  
 
Although most new media objects are based on various applications of structural 
programming they attain some other characteristics that differentiate them from 
structured computer programs. Deleting parts of a new media object will not 
collapse the whole application. Likewise, adding new parts will not end up in 
confusion or disorder. Possessing a non-hierarchical structure, new media gives 
us a multitude of possibilities to link documents, sounds, graphics or images in an 
potentially infinite variety of non-linear paths. 
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Similarly, World Wide Web as a non-hierarchical structure actualizes such a 
model through the network. Moreover, Web involves a peculiar collaboration 
between the users of the network. Instead of being created by a single author, 
links could be written by anyone participating the system. Hence, there emerges 
an open flow of ideas and information between the collaborators of the network. 
 
Furthermore, with the integration of the hypertext and hypermedia applications 
new media begins to support mind’s process of free association. Manovich writes: 
“…interactive computer media perfectly fits this trend to externalize and objectify 
the mind’s operations. The very principle of hyper-linking, which forms the basis 
of interactive media, objectifies the process of association, often taken to be 
central to human thinking. Mental processes of reflection, problem solving, 
recall, and association are externalized, equated with following a link, moving to 
a new page, choosing a new image, or a new scene” (Manovich 61). 
 
Thus, decentered and non-hierarchical models of new media produces a realm in 
which we leap from one image, text, graphic or idea to the next in a series of 
juxtapositions that present alternatives to conventional hierarchies. We find 
ourselves within a multidirectional web of different voices, ideas and perceptions. 
Hence, we discover previously undetected connections and arrangements between 
things, images, and/or bodies. Confronted with the non-linear and non-
representative ways of thinking, we become suspicious of pre-established ways.  
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Indeed, these models produce a plane of immanence in which we perceive 
becoming of phenomena rather than its stabilized snapshots, that is, objects or 
beings that are represented. Going beyond the traditional definitions of time and 
space, we are introduced to a realm of events that appear in the form of endless 
juxtapositions.  
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5 CONCLUSION  
 
In Matter and Memory and The Creative Evolution, Bergson attempts at 
apprehending becoming with a new tool, which he calls intuition. He aims to 
grasp the nature of movement and duration within that method of intuition. The 
method involves apprehending phenomena not in stability but in mobility. 
According to Bergson, any model, which attempts to constitute movement by 
immobile sections, will fall into an illusion. It is in this sense that he sees 
cinematography as ‘the perfected apparatus of an oldest illusion’.  
 
However, for Deleuze, cinematography becomes “the organ for perfecting the 
new reality”. Opposing what Bergson once said about cinematographic image, he 
insists that cinema does not attempt to constitute a false movement with immobile 
sections. In other words, cinema does not give us an image to which movement is 
added. He argues that cinema immediately gives us a movement image. Thus, it 
does give us a mobile section, not an immobile section + abstract movement.  
 
This mobile section is the concrete intermediary between a whole and a set. It is 
the movement-image, which constitutes the relationship between parts and its 
affection of the whole. On the one hand, a shot modifies the respective positions 
of the parts of a closed set. On the other it is itself the mobile section of a whole 
whose change it expresses. A movement-image reunites the represented objects in 
a frame into a single duration. This single duration is the open whole.  
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To put it differently, we may say that since that open whole is neither given nor 
giveable, its nature is to change constantly and give rise to something new. And 
this whole appears as an indivisible continuity. It is through the relations of 
bodies in space, the whole is transformed. And according to Deleuze, duration is 
the whole of these relations.  
 
It is the montage in cinema. When we watch a film we are confronted not only 
with represented objects or bodies moving in space, but with a virtual plane that 
is composed of incorporeals, events and singularities. Hence, breaking the 
hegemony of representation, cinema produces a plane of immanence on which 
image and thought merge.  
 
Therefore, the cinematographic language appears as a new way of handling the 
phenomena, which reveals itself in its ever-changing flux. It opens the possibility 
of constructions in experience prior to subjects and objects. It exiles us from a 
familiar conceptual terrain. By employing the movement-image and the time 
image it opens the possibility to deterritorialisation of ourselves. It encourages us 
to think in terms of multiplicities and singularities rather than identities and 
propositions. 
 
Deleuze says in the interview of Cahier du Cinema “I liked the authors who 
demanded that we introduce movement to thought, ‘real’ movement (they 
denounced the Hegelian dialectic as abstract movement). How could I not 
discover the cinema, which introduces the ‘real’ movement into the image” 
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(Flaxman 366). It is in this sense that cinematography becomes ‘the organ for 
perfecting the new reality’ instead of being ‘just the perfected apparatus of the 
oldest illusion’ (Cinema I 8). And according to Deleuze, this is where the power 
of cinematography lies.  
 
Similarly, extracting the body from organistic representation Bacon's painting 
does the same. It employs ‘a logic of sense and event’ rather than ‘a logic of 
predication and truth’. Transcending the figurative painting, Bacon mainly 
attempts at freeing both subject and object from sensation. 
 
Being isolated via special techniques, the Figure always appears as a deformed 
body escaping from itself. There occurs a movement from the Figure to the field, 
and vice versa. Losing its organistic representation, the body turns into a body 
without organs. It appears as an indeterminate organ. The organs lose their 
determinate character and become transitory. They are determined according to 
the forces that are exerted upon them.  
 
By losing its contours, the body integrates into something. This ‘something’ may 
be seen as concrete duration, namely, the whole. This ever-changing whole is 
where the multiplicity of forces acts. The whole emerges as a plane of intensities 
and forces at work. Hence, the painting becomes a plane of incorporealities rather 
than a collection of represented objects.  
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The multiplicity of forces that are exerted upon bodies creates a field of 
becoming. This is a plane, in which tension appears. This tension produces a 
multiplicity of sensation. Seen from that aspect, this multiplicity of sensation is 
related to forces rather than forms.   
 
Indeed, it is the reality of becoming that is unceasingly integrated into the whole. 
This process refers to opening of a whole which endure, and whose movements 
are so many mobile sections crossing the closed systems. Hence, we are face to 
face with forces and intensities rather than represented objects. This is a place 
where the levels of sensation appear.  
 
Everything seems restrained. But it is something that is going to happen. The 
tension is always there. This tension is the movement. And through that 
movement the whole is divided up into objects and objects are re-united in the 
whole. 
 
Indeed, this is what new media does and should achieve, in order to get away 
from the representation in thought. To create sensations in which the whole is 
divided up into the whole and the objects are re-united in the whole. To produce 
singularities prior to the world determined by predicates. To map out 
multiplicities which are determined by the forces and intensities. To create planes 
of immanence in which these multiplicities merge. Then, to connect and 
reconnect these planes unceasingly. 
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Although an unstructured and non-hierarchical model of new media employs 
various operations of structural computer programs that work with binary logic, it 
makes its own rupture, its own line of flight. It constitutes a map rather than a 
tracing. “What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented 
toward an experimentation in contact with the real…It fosters connections 
between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum 
opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency…The map is open 
and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to 
constant modification” (Deleuze and Guattari 12).  
 
Such a decentered and non-hierarchical model appears as a map that has multiple 
entryways. It acts like a web of multiple threads. Like rhizome, it has neither 
beginning nor end, but always a middle from which it grows. “In contrast to 
centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication 
and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, 
nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or 
central automaton, defined solely by circulation of sets” (Deleuze and Guattari 
21). 
 
Seen from that aspect, certain types of new media tend to be the ‘line of flight’ of 
the structural computer programming. A decentered model of a new media object 
makes its own rupture and deterritorializes the very arborescent structure of it. 
Deleuze and Guattari write: “The wisdom of plants: even when they have roots, 
there is always an outside where they form a rhizome with something else – with 
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the wind, an animal, human beings” (Deleuze and Guattari 11). Such a model, 
defying the laws of programming, forms a rhizome with life and art. It establishes 
connections and arrangements that are infinitely forking.  
 
However, this relation between art and life is no longer based on imitation or 
representation. Within the context of these unstructured, rhizomic and non-
hierarchical models of new media, art ceases to be the mirror of life. It is no more 
reflecting the outer reality. Hence, we witness the blurring of the boundaries 
between life and art, the personal and the mediated, the real and the virtual. What 
emerges is a plane of immanence that excludes any kind of duality or dichotomy. 
“There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line 
of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back 
to one another. This is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in 
the rudimentary form of the good and the bad…Good and bad are only the 
products of an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 9).  
 
From this point of view, art and life seem somehow connected. One is caught up 
in the other. Art, with its multiple modes of interaction, becomes part of life. 
Life, with its manner of becomings, expands and intensifies art. The relation in-
between is determined by interlinking of the two becomings. “…The book is not 
an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel 
evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of 
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the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn 
deterritorializes itself in the world” (Deleuze and Guattari 11). 
 
However, new media objects may exist in the form of both rhizomic and 
arborescent structures. Within an certain application we may confront semiotic 
chains, organizations of power or stratifications instead of deterritorializations. 
Moreover, the possibility of reterritorialization never ceases to exist. “You make 
a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter 
organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a 
signifier, attributions that reconstitute subject” (Deleuze and Guattari 9). 
 
In other words, new media may emerge either in the form of hierarchical, 
structured, author-centered media or in the form of rhizomic, interactive and the 
collaborative one. The former provides tools for the social construction of 
meaning and communication. These are arborescent structures, which are 
centered models that aim at signifying and codifying meaning in order to 
establish hierarchies between subjectified units. 
 
However, the latter has a character that is against codified complexes of meaning. 
This plane is composed not of units but dimensions and directions in motion. This 
is where rhizomic structures defy the arborescent ones. In this plane of 
immanence, we are confronted with neither subjects nor objects, but rather linear 
multiplicities with n dimensions. “Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of 
points and positions, with binary relations between points and biunivocal 
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relationships between positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: the line of 
segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or 
deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity 
undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature” (Deleuze and Guattari 21).  
 
To assign a language and/or meaning to this ever-changing terrain of 
multiplicities is to limit its possibilities. A non-hierarchical, open and 
collaborative model is that which resists definitions. The definitions are 
contingent and confining. Seen from that aspect, such a model acts like a 
dictionary or encyclopaedia that is under a ceaseless construction. Defying the 
codified complexes of meaning, it appears as a tool that could extent our mental 
capability. To put it in Deleuzian words, it may be seen as the ‘organ for 
perfecting reality’. The reality of becoming. 
 
To conclude, I argue that although new media objects employ structured database 
systems, they somehow include the capacity to transform the structured and 
restricted experience into an open and deterritorialized one. Challenging the 
traditional categories, these unstructured and rhizomic arrangements of particular 
new media objects open a passage to deterritorialization of both the image and 
ourselves. Hence, what we see in an image, or what we hear in a sound block is 
not only the representation of objects, narration of a theme or illustration of 
beings but also the variation or expansion of pure becoming, which is connectable 
and modifiable in many parts.  
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Therefore, such a deterritorialized application of new media appears as a terrain, 
which is in the state of constant transformation. Again, we are confronted with a 
plane of immanence which gives us a chance to think the nature of becoming and 
change. It is a plane, in which events and singularities take place in the form of 
juxtapositions. Indeed, this is also a chance to think the connection between art 
and life. Via the blurring the boundaries, the practice of art is redefined. Hence, 
art does not have to imitate or represent nature in order to be celebrated. By 
establishing new connections and arrangements within an unceasing flux, it 
becomes what we call life. Hence, it becomes what celebrates life. Life within the 
course of its becoming. 
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